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the 2007 Kenyan Elections**

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Abstract

What might have caused the post-2007 election violence in Kenya? Was it election irregularities as widely claimed or could it have been simmering ethnic-rivalries waiting to spill over? While not directly focusing on the post-election violence, we investigate a number of issues that divided Kenyans in the 2007 Presidential election. Following a rational choice framework and using survey data of voter opinions, we find that Kenyan voters are strategic, seeking to maximize their well-being and influenced by a number of factors that go beyond their ethnicity such as their absolute and relative living standards, access to public goods and also grievances arising from perceptions of discrimination. The evidence suggests that Kenyan voting behavior is economically motivated, with retrospective interests, thus contrasting other studies that consider Kenyans to be wholly identity voters. The study also reveals significant heterogeneity depending on the voters' primary loci of identification— either in terms of their ethnicity, occupation or nationalistic terms (Kenyans). The apparent ethnic divisions have resulted in a polarized society with consequential weakening of the institutional base for economic development. The study points to the necessity of institutional reforms that can better harmonize ethnic claims and avert conflicts in the future.

Journal of Economic Literature Classification: D72, D74

Keywords: Election, Economics of Voting, Ethnic Divisions, Conflict

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Identity, Grievances, and Economic Determinants of Voting in the 2007 Kenyan Elections¹

I. Introduction

The economic models of voting are founded on the premise that voters are rational and “hard wired” with selfish preferences. Like in the market for goods and services, actors in the political markets engage in utility maximizing calculus when evaluating alternative issues or candidates. Faced with two or more alternatives, agents with selfish preferences make choices that best serve their individual interests and thus consistent with the expected utility maximization axiom.² Rational choice voting models provide a number of testable propositions of the behavior of voters including the decision whether to participate in an election and the choice between candidates and issues. The theoretical proposition of the rational voter model finds empirical support in many studies of voting in western democracies (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000; Pacek and Radcliff 1995).³

Much less is known about the determinants of voting behavior in developing countries. This is particularly the case for Africa where few countries have had a history of what would be considered regular, free and fair elections. For most of the post-independence era, the majority of African countries have been either under military or single party rule. Even when elections were held under a single party rule, the results were subject to manipulation and hence not reliable as

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² In the basic rational choice voting model as developed by Downs (1957) and extended by Tullock (1967) and Riker and Ordeshook (1968, 1973), a voter takes into account the expected utility arising from voting which depends on the expected benefits and costs of voting. This model has been extended to take into account the utility arising from the act of voting and also game theoretic approaches such as where the rational voter adopts a maximin-regret strategy and where voting is modeled as a game of cat and mouse (see Ledyard 1981, 1984; Rosenthal 1983 and Ferejohn and Fiorina 1974).

³ This paper does not dwell on the decision whether or not to participate in an election but rather focuses on a voter’s choice between candidates.

indicators of voter intentions. It is only with the democratization movement that swept the continent during the 1980s and 1990s that many of the countries started holding regular and competitive elections. Nevertheless, even where elections have been held on a regular basis, consistent data on individual voting behavior that permit testing of the rational voter models are rare. This is because the data are highly aggregated and not suited to evaluate the importance of different factors that enter into a voter's utility function. While such data provide some broad generalizations of "group" voting patterns, they are not well suited to analyze individual voting behavior as predicted by the rational voter model.

It is now widely accepted that the primary problem hindering development in many countries is their weak institutions. Institutional arrangements matter in influencing development outcomes as they determine human interactions in a society and the types and quality of policies that governments adopt. A common feature of weak institutions is the poor quality of governance as characterized by a lack of accountability and transparency. Democratization that involves opening political markets to political party competition and regular elections is considered central to institutional building in these countries. However, evidence is mixed as to whether competitive elections are stabilizing or not. On the one hand, open elections help in mediating disputes among groups and install broadly legitimate governments and thus increase institutional stability (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Carothers 2007; Soudriette and Pilon 2007). On the other hand, there are also concerns that in ethnically divided societies, competitive electoral processes could in fact be destabilizing because such competitive politics tends to widen existing divisions and election outcomes deepen divisions between winners and losers (Snyder 2000; Wilkinson 2004; Mansfield and Snyder 2005, Eifert, Miguel and Posner 2007). To appreciate the role that competitive politics play in institution building, a better understanding of voting behavior and especially the motivation for voter choices and also the issues that divide them is necessary.

This study seeks to evaluate voting behavior in Kenya with a view to identifying the most important factors that influence electoral choices and also the issues that divide Kenyans. While

Kenya has remained fairly stable and peaceful during most of the post-independence period, violence between ethnic groups has tended to erupt around elections since the introduction of competitive multiparty politics. Ethnic violence and general lawlessness escalated following the December 27, 2007 elections resulting in loss of hundreds of lives and widespread destruction of property. The study uses a unique dataset of Kenyan voters obtained from a survey conducted two weeks before the 27 December 2007 general elections to estimate the determinants of voter preferences. Of special interest is whether the revealed voter intentions can provide insights into the widespread ethnic violence that erupted after the 2007 elections. In Section II, we provide a brief general discussion of what is known about voting behavior in Africa. Section III outlines a model of candidate choice within the Kenyan context following the rational choice framework. In Section IV, we present some highlights of the data focusing on voter intentions. Section V discusses the empirical models and results, and Section VI concludes.

II. Voting in Africa

Several authors suggest that voting behavior in Africa is predominantly influenced by some form of identity factor such as ethnicity, family lineages, religion, etc. (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997; Barkan 1979; Ferree 2004, 2008; Lindberg et al 2008). Substantial empirical evidence supports the view that the African is primarily an “identity” voter. In essence, voting in Africa is in many cases nothing more than an ethnic census. An individual voter uses ethnicity as the proxy for the expected benefits for voting for a particular candidate. Simply, voting in Africa is considered to be largely dependent on ethnic identification. Fridy (2007) for example concludes that ethnicity is an extremely significant factor in Ghanaian elections. Likewise, Erdmann (2007) finds that voter alignment and party affiliation are largely influenced by ethnicity. Thus, although not exclusively, political parties in Africa tend to be dominated by particular ethnic groups rather than being on the basis of ideology.

Ndegwa (1997) explains the observed ethnic voting patterns as due to the fact that Africans possess “dual citizenship.” That is, Africans are members of two types of political communities in the same temporal and spatial world. On the one hand, they are members of their civic-republican community which is often their ethnic or community group and to which they owe some obligations. At the same time, they are members of the modern national state. Ndegwa suggests that the membership in the national state is guided by conception of status and rights rather than duties. This dual citizenship undermines the democratization process as Africans continue to show allegiance to their civic republican community.

Ethnic voting in Africa gives credence to Horowitz’s (1985) expressive voting hypothesis whereby ethnic voters use their votes to register their identity as members of groups. Such voting implies that voting is not the outcome of a careful evaluation of policy positions or the performance of leaders. Instead, it is identity that matters. Fish (2008) describes identity politics as follows:

You are practicing identity politics when you vote for or against someone because of his or her skin color, ethnicity, religion, gender, sexual orientation, or any marker that leads you to say yes or no independently of a candidate’s ideas or policies. In essence, identity politics is an affirmation of tribe against the claims of ideology.....An identity politics voter says in effect, I don’t care what views he holds, or even what bad things he may have done, or what lack of ability he may display, he’s my brother, or he’s my kinsman, or he’s my landsman,...

In some cases, voting seems to go beyond ethnicity. In a study of the 1994 Malawi’s general election, Kalipeni (1997) shows that regionalism was the dominant factor explaining voting patterns. Although Malawi has many ethnic groups, none can claim a majority which necessitates formation of coalitions. The evidence shows that ethnic groups crystallized to form three “super ethnic groups” each in a distinct region. Although Kalipen suggests that voting patterns are primarily due to regionalism rather than ethnicity, it is clear that ethnicity remains important.

In a study of Nigerian elections, Lewis (2007) observes that while identity is important in Nigerian politics, ethnicity is not the only axis of identification. Identity in Nigeria takes many dimensions such as ethnicity, economic and religion. Furthermore, Lewis finds that identity is not

fixed and varies by region and over time. In other words, identity is rather fluid. Nevertheless, Lewis finds that ethnic feelings are strongest in for example the Niger Delta where people feel discriminated and exploited.

Some recent studies using survey data of voting in Africa suggest that, while ethnicity is an important determinant of voting behavior in Africa, it is not the only factor (Bratton, et al 2005). Some studies find that that Africans are concerned about other factors that relate to their well-being. In particular, some studies have shown that Africans are concerned about pocketbook issues such as their incomes and other indicators of economic well-being such as employment, living standards and provision of public goods (Posner and Simon 2002; Youde 2005). Furthermore, controlling for these other factors weakens the importance of ethnicity. In short, ethnicity is important in voting decisions of Africans but might not necessarily be the most important.

Kenya has for long been touted as beacon of peace, a success story in an otherwise troubled continent. Unlike many of her neighbors, Kenya has never experienced extensive civil strife or a military coup and the country has been under civilian rule since attaining independence in 1963. This state of relative stability was achieved primarily under a single-party rule and under a constitutional arrangement that endowed the presidency with immense powers. Before 1991, the country appeared politically united and elections were held on regular basis without major problems although the president had a lot to say about which candidates were cleared by the party to compete in the elections. This appearance of peace, stability and unity unraveled after the introduction of competitive politics in 1991. During the 1992 and 1997 general elections, widespread ethnic violence occurred before the elections (Kimenyi and Ndung'u 2005). Analysis of voting behavior based on aggregate data suggests that, since the return of multiparty democracy in 1991, ethnicity has been a dominant factor in explaining voting patterns in Kenya (Kimenyi 1997; Muigai 1995; Orvis 2001). Basically, it seems that members of particular ethnic groups mostly join the same parties and primarily support the same candidates. Many analysts

have therefore concluded that voting in Kenya, like in many other African countries, is merely an “ethnic census.” Oyugi (1997) for example shows that ethnicity was the most defining factor in the 1992 elections. Not only were political parties formed along ethnic lines, but also voting was primarily in ethnic blocks. This pattern was repeated in the 1997 general elections. However, in the 2002 elections, several ethnic groups came together to form a grand coalition.⁴ By and large, the recent elections in Kenya have taken a clear ethnic dimension.

Nevertheless, it might be misleading to conclude that voting in Kenya is influenced purely by identity. First, it would suggest that all individuals in an ethnic group vote the same way regardless of age, gender, income group or profession. Although majority of voters from a particular group may vote for a particular candidate or issue, aggregate data does not for example reveal whether the poor and the rich, or young and old, exhibit similar voting patterns. Second, it could be that ethnicity correlates with other factors such as poverty, income, unemployment, etc. As such, many members of a group may vote against an incumbent not because he or she is a member of a different ethnic group but because they may consider the incumbent as having failed to deal with creating opportunities for growth in their regions. Finally, the ethnic census argument would seem to suggest that, quality of leadership as demonstrated by policy and implementation does not really matter.

III. A Model of Candidate Choice

To model the voters’ choices, we assume that the country is represented by voters who share a utility function of the following general form:

$$U_k(Q_i, G_i, \gamma) \tag{1}$$

Where Q_i is private consumption, G_i is consumption of publicly provided goods and services and γ is a measure of the cost of voting. We denote institutional arrangements with k which signifies

⁴ Nevertheless, this coalition was short lived and broke down following disagreements over the proposed constitution.

leadership under the incumbent president Kibaki—or simply the pre-election status quo. The first decision the voter makes is whether to participate in the elections at all. Denote participation decision by p where $p=1$ if the citizen decides to vote and $p=0$ if the citizen does not participate. The citizen then decides either to vote for Kibaki ($k=1$) or opposition candidate ($k=0$). The probability of an individual voting for Kibaki “ $k=1$ ” or alternative candidates “ $k=0$ ” is assumed to depend on the expected benefits such that:

$$k=1 \text{ if } U_{k=1}(Q_i, G_i, \gamma) > U_{k=0}(Q_i, G_i, \gamma) \text{ and } k=0 \text{ if } U_{k=0}(Q_i, G_i, \gamma) > U_{k=1}(Q_i, G_i, \gamma) \quad (2)$$

Although the cost γ of participating in the electoral process varies across individuals and regions, we assume that the cost is uniform across all voters of type $k=0$ and $k=1$. In other words, there is no reason to believe that cost of voting varies systematically between supporters and opponents of the various candidates. Thus we ignore any differences in participation rates that could arise because of differences in γ .

Q_i and G_i depend on a vector of variables X that influence voters’ well-being in terms of consumption of private goods and publicly provided goods. Thus the probability of an individual (i) voting for Kibaki ($k=1$) can be expressed by the cumulative logistic distribution function as follows:

$$K_i = 1/[1 + e^{-(\alpha + \beta X_i)}] \quad (3)$$

The survey data used in this study permits us to estimate the logistic function directly because data are based on individual voter responses and include a wide range of demographic characteristics and indicators of individuals’ economic status.

Private consumption (Q) is largely a function of one’s earning opportunities in the market place and can be proxied by indicators such as voter’s living conditions and employment status. In making voting choices amongst a number of candidates, voters evaluate their current economic status and in particular the changes during the incumbent’s tenure. If opportunities for earning market incomes improved, then the probability of voting for the incumbent increases, and vice versa. In studying voting in the 2007 elections, this aspect is of particular importance. President

Kibaki came to power at a time when the country was in a dire economic state characterized by very low rate of economic growth. During the five years of his presidency, the country achieved growth rates, exceeding 6 percent in 2007.

But economic growth may not tell the whole story. In their evaluation of the incumbent versus opposition candidates, voters evaluate their current economic status both in absolute and also relative terms. As the Kenyan economy expanded, there was widespread skepticism that only the well-off were actually benefiting from the expansion. We consider this perception—real or imagined to be a source of grievance.

Government provision (G) can be highly valued and is expected to have major influence on voting decisions. Generally, voters have expectations of some quantity and quality of public goods and services such as law and order, health care, education, etc. Over the last few years, particular concern has been on quality of infrastructure, cost of schooling and corruption among others. Because of the importance of these types of goods in a voter's utility function, voters can be expected to reward or punish the incumbent depending on how well they consider the government to have performed in delivery of goods and services. First, voters evaluate the incumbent relative to previous regime. Voters could also evaluate Kibaki's performance in regard to the provision of public goods by evaluating his government's pre-2002 election pledges. If he kept most of the pledges during his term, then voters would be inclined to support him, and vice versa. Voters would also have evaluated incumbents and opposition candidates based on the pledges made during the 2007 election campaigns. If the incumbent had fulfilled previous pledges, voters are more likely to believe him on new pledges. On the other hand, voters may prefer opposition candidates because of their pledges and also as a punishment for the failure of the incumbent to keep pledges.⁵

Based on the existing evidence, there does appear to be a link between group identity and expectation of publicly provided goods. While voters expect candidates to perform in the delivery

⁵ The failure to keep pledges is discussed later in this section as another possible source of grievance.

of services in general, they also expect patronage goods from those with whom they share identity (Kimenyi 2006). It is for this reason that voters tend to identify along some identifying cleavages. To understand how identity influences voting behavior, we decompose G as follows:

$$G = g_g + g_p \quad (4)$$

where g_g signifies general provision of public goods (non-excludable) that benefit all members of the society and g_p are patronage goods that benefit members of a particular group only.⁶ Thus, for each candidate, a voter evaluates expected utility from g_g and g_p . Assuming that patronage goods are provided only on the basis of identity, then g_p is positive for a voter if the winning candidate is a member of the same ethnic group. Thus, other things equal, a citizen who is a member of group (i) will vote for a candidate from another ethnic group (j) only if expected utility from public goods under a president from group j (U_{ij}) is greater than the expected utility from public and patronage good provided under a president from own group (i) (U_{ii}). Thus, non ethnic voting occurs if :

$$U_{ij}(g_g) > U_{ii}(g_g) + U_{ii}(g_p) \quad (5)$$

Simply, if voters expect patronage goods from the leaders with whom they share identity, then they are likely to practice identity politics. We note that there are many characteristics that individuals could identify with. According to the previous literature, probably the most important identifying feature is ethnicity. Other loci of identification can include aspects such as voter's education level, occupation, age and religion. The point we stress here is that voters, expecting patronage goods, are likely to vote for those candidates with whom they share identity.

A ruler benefits from providing patronage goods because such solidifies support and any other non-pecuniary benefits that may go with "supporting own community." But provision of patronage goods could also come at a cost. As more resources are devoted to g_p , less g_g is supplied to the citizens. In other words, as a government rewards supporters with jobs and other

⁶ One way to think of patronage goods is the privatization of public goods for the benefit of specific people or groups.

benefits, less of general public goods are provided which lowers the probability of voting for the incumbent. This effect can be expected to be more important among those who do not share identity with the incumbent. The other costs, and probably more important, is that provision of patronage goods necessarily translates into widespread grievances. As members of one group benefit disproportionately from political allocation of resources, others lose and feel discriminated against and basically ignored by the incumbent.

Another possible source of grievance is the failure of an incumbent to deliver on pledges of public goods made or to go against the general will of the people. During the 2002 campaigns, then candidate Kibaki ran on a platform to fight rampant corruption, provision of free primary education and enactment of a constitution that devolved executive powers. We expect that voter's evaluation of Kibaki's performance on these issues to impact their voting decisions.

IV. Analysis of Voter Intentions

As observed above, the majority of studies about voting behavior in Kenya and in Africa generally are based on aggregate data. Unfortunately such data are not well suited to reveal voter intentions as they lack vital socio-economic information, views on grievances, economic interests, evaluation of policy, etc. In this study, we overcome these limitations by using a detailed survey data on voter characteristics and opinions.

We use data from a nationally representative survey of Kenyans aged 18 and over conducted just two weeks ahead of the General Election of 27 December 2007 hence providing a good picture of voting intentions and economic/political perceptions. To ensure that respondents fully understand the survey questions, whenever possible interviews were conducted in the respondents' mother tongue. In total, interviews were conducted in 10 of the most widely spoken languages in Kenya. The sample includes 1,207 Kenyans from all the eight provinces, and covering 76 out of 210 electoral constituencies. The sample captures the rural/urban split consistent with the most recent Kenyan census that shows that 65 percent of respondents live in

rural areas and the remainder in urban areas. The ethnic distribution of the sample respondents also matches to that of the national population.⁷

At the time of our survey, most respondents –96 percent planned to participate in the elections. Our survey showed that the leading candidates—Kibaki and Odinga- were in a virtual statistical tie and any of them could have won depending on voter turnout. The Election Commission of Kenya declared Kibaki the winner with 51.3 percent of the votes to 48.7 percent for Odinga. The opposition claimed fraud and international electoral observers reported a number of irregularities in the tallying and counting of ballots. The outcome of the elections, and primarily because of the belief that the election was rigged, culminated in unprecedented level of violence. While our research does not dwell on issue of irregularities, we are able to infer from the survey that the electorate was highly polarized between two candidates, Odinga and the incumbent president Kibaki.

But what is the root cause of the polarization of the Kenyan electorate? Was it just ethnic rivalry waiting at the surface to spill over as much of the media has reported? Perhaps, a way to start unravelling this complex issue is to understand in the first place, the most important factors that motivated Kenyans to support their preferred candidates. We asked Kenyans this question in our survey and the responses were as Figure 1 shows.

[Figure 1]

As the results show, over 90 percent of the respondents stated that they would select a candidate based on the candidate's track record in terms of honesty, experience in handling funds and care for the community. Perhaps, most surprisingly, only less than one per cent of survey respondents (0.80 percent) stated that the ethnicity/tribe of the candidate was the most important factor in shaping their voting motivations. This contrasts to what has been portrayed about the Kenyan

⁷ In piloting and fieldwork we found that the vast majority of Kenyans were welcoming and eager to talk freely about their voting intentions. The survey reached a response rate of 80 per cent, a high rate for studies of this kind in Kenya.

voter especially in light of the post-electoral conflict and also the evidence of identity voting reported in previous studies.

Classifying voter preferences for presidential candidate based on the voters' ethnic group shows that there is unison in voting patterns among most ethnic groups. The three main presidential candidates, Kibaki (a Kikuyu), Odinga (a Luo) and Kalonzo (a Kamba) were overwhelmingly supported by the people from their own ethnic groups (as shown in Figure 2). That is 40 per cent of the surveyed population intended to vote along tribal lines. Other ethnic groups that did not have a major presidential candidate seem to have voted for one of the candidates in a block: The Luhyas and Kalenjins primarily supported mainly Odinga while the Merus and Embus supported Kibaki. Hence, most ethnic groups voted along ethnic lines.

[Figure 2]

The contrasting evidence in our survey between voting intentions by ethnicity and the self-described voting motivations might also suggest that Kenyans are in denial. Kenyans could be voting on ethnic lines, despite not acknowledging ethnicity to be their main motivations to vote. An explanation of this could be that Kenyans are trapped in a low-trust equilibrium. Kenyans might not want to vote based on ethnic lines, but because they expect others to vote along tribal lines, they also adopt an ethnic voting strategy. The belief that others would vote on the basis of ethnicity could be reinforced by the fact that much of the political campaigning played on the ethnic sensitivities and loyalties of their followers inducing voters to cast their ballots along ethnic lines. As the Daily Nation put it in an editorial: "What, at the moment, seems to matter is the ethnicity of the three candidates, one reason why Kenyans keep voting for the wrong people..."

However, one should be cautious in drawing bold conclusions from the strong correlation between ethnicity and voting intentions. Correlations do not reveal causalities. Ethnicity could be masking other factors. Furthermore, identity goes beyond one's ethnic group as socio-economic aspects come into play. Kenyans have enjoyed a rapid economic and social transformation over

recent years involving a speedy expansion of the middle class, urbanisation and growing expectations about what democracy can deliver. All these factors undoubtedly contribute to re-shaping Kenyans identity. It is then important to understand how Kenyans see themselves. To analyse this we asked the following question: *We have spoken to many Kenyans and they have all described themselves in different ways. Some people describe themselves in terms of their language, ethnic group, race, religion or gender and others describe themselves in economic terms, such as working class, middle class or a farmer. Besides being Kenyan, which specific group do you feel you belong to first and foremost?*

When asked to depict their group identity in this way, few Kenyans (20 percent) identify in terms of their ethnicity, 37 percent of respondents insisted on identifying themselves first and foremost in nationalistic terms, that is as Kenyans. The rest of respondents, that is 43 percent, identify themselves on non-ethnic or nationalistic basis, notably those based on occupation (18 percent), social class (7 percent), gender (4 percent) and on religion (3 percent).

By depicting how the distinct identity groups intended to vote, we see that there is no correlation between how Kenyans intended to vote and how they primarily identify themselves. Figure 3 reveals that the Kenyan electorate was divided between Kibaki and Odinga, regardless of which category they identify themselves with. In other words, support for leading candidates was not based on these other axis of identification. Thus, when we take into account how Kenyans identify themselves, it becomes apparent that Kenyan's voting intentions went beyond mere tribalism. Tribalism might well be an important aspect, but it is not the only one. But what else could have divided the Kenyan voters so severely?

[Figure 3]

Potential grievances could have been caused by recent and past performance of the incumbent president Kibaki. He has irrefutably improved the economic outlook of Kenya since 2002. In his own words, Kibaki stated:

Under my stewardship, together with you all, we have revived the economy, growing at a record rate of 6.1% in 2006, and created over 1,800,000 jobs, both in informal and formal sectors, resulting in better incomes for the people of Kenya. Per-capital incomes have increased from an average US \$ 400 in 2002 to an impressive US \$ 630 today, and are set to grow ever further under the PNU Government. Our growing economy has supplied us with the means to reduce poverty levels by an impressive 10.8 percentage points from 56.8% in 2000 to 46.0 of the population in 2006. Consequently more than two (2) million people have been lifted out of absolute poverty since we came to office. Together we have fought ignorance on every front, ensuring that every child has the opportunity to learn through the Free Primary Education. (PNU 2007, p.1)

As our survey shows, the Kibaki administration received favourable approval by most Kenyans. For instance, we asked Kenyans to compare the overall economic conditions during Kibaki's administration to that of the immediate former president Daniel Moi. According to our survey, 60 percent of respondents perceived the economic conditions of the country to be better or much better during Kibaki's rule, whilst 25 percent perceived it worse or much worse. The survey data reveals that roughly half of those who considered economic conditions to have improved during Kibaki's first term intended to re-elect him. In contrast, those who thought the economic conditions were better during Moi's rule intended to vote for the opposition candidates and more so for Odinga.

These perceptions of the overall economic performance could well have influenced Kenyan's voting intentions. But these perceptions refer to how Kenyans through the incumbent President has ruled Kenyans in general terms. A more direct source of concern for voters could be how their specific living conditions changed during Kibaki's rule. According to our survey, 29 percent perceived their living conditions were better or much better during Kibaki's rule. The majority of Kenyans, 71 percent of respondents, did not see an improvement in their living conditions during Kibaki's rule. Specifically 26 percent thought that their living conditions were the same and 45 percent thought that their living conditions were worse or much worse during Kibaki's rule.

[Figure 4]

Kibaki's performance ratings give a mixed picture. They suggest that although the majority of respondents recognise Kibaki administrations overall economic achievements, only a few felt that their living conditions actually improved during Kibaki's rule. In other words, Kenyans perceptions could suggest that the economic benefits gained during Kibaki's rule were concentrated to only a few people. So it is not surprising that the majority of people who did not consider their living conditions to have improved intended to vote for opposition candidates. Figure 5 shows that 81 percent of those who perceived their living conditions as worse or much worse during Kibaki's rule intended to vote for Odinga. In contrast, the majority (63 percent) of those who perceived their living conditions as better or much better during Kibaki's rule intended to re-elect Kibaki.

[Figure 5]

In addition to Kibaki's past record, the future governance structure of the country was another major issue discussed during the election campaigns. The economic and political outlook of the nation undoubtedly could also have affected Kenyan's voting intentions. Kibaki first became President in 2002 aided by the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) bringing to an end KANU's one-party dominance since Independence in 1963. The NARC government promised to deliver a new constitution devolving power away from the centre, to settle land rights that had caused violent conflict in the past, and also to share political power among Kenya's diverse groups—possibly between a President and a Prime Minister.

In the third year of Kibaki's administration, a draft constitution was prepared and was subjected to a referendum in November 2005. This draft constitution was overwhelmingly rejected by the Kenyans primarily because the proposed constitution still concentrated powers on the presidency. The outcome of this referendum was a blow to Kibaki's leadership two years ahead of the presidential election. Although it was not a vote of confidence on Kibaki's three year-old administration, some Kenyans could have voted against the ratification of the draft constitution in part because they were disillusioned with Kibaki's government. Furthermore, the

referendum left the nation and the cabinet divided on a vital issue –how to share economic and political power in Kenya. Then Roads Minister Raila Odinga and Environment Minister Kalonzo Musyoka, along several key ministers who led the group opposing the approval of the referendum, were sacked from Kibaki’s administration and subsequently formed a new opposition political party, the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM).⁸

The unresolved issue of the constitution was again important during the 2007 Elections. We find a high correlation between how people voted in the 2005 Referendum and people’s intention to vote in the 2007 Presidential elections. Of those respondents in our survey who participated in the 2005 constitutional referendum, 45 percent voted against the ratification of the draft constitution and 25 percent voted in favour of the draft constitution. Figure 6 shows that among those who voted in favour of the constitution, a large majority (83 percent) intended to vote for Kibaki. In contrast, 82 percent of those who voted against the draft constitution stated that they would vote for Odinga or Kalonzo. Thus, the majority of those who supported the referendum, also supported Kibaki in the election. Similarly, the majority of those who voted against the draft constitution did not support Kibaki in the 2007 election.

[Figure 6]

V. Empirical Model of Voting Behaviour in Kenya:

To understand the determinants of voting behavior in Kenya, we turn to testing a number of hypotheses of voter behavior within a rational choice framework. The theoretical proposition of the rational voter model suggests that voters’ behavior is strategic, seeking to maximize their well-being and influenced by a number of factors that go beyond a voter’s socio-economic identity such as ethnicity.

⁸ The ODM would face again Kibaki in the 2007 Presidential elections. In an unexpected twist, four months ahead of the elections the ODM split in two fractions as the party failed to select a presidential candidate. So Kibaki faced a divided opposition led by Odinga under ODM and Kalonzo Musyoka under the ODM faction –ODM-Kenya.

Here, we investigate what socio identities, economic interest, policy issues and grievances stirred Kenyans to vote (or not to vote) for Kibaki. To do so, we focus our analysis on those survey respondents that claimed they were registered to vote and were planning to vote in the 2007 elections. This group consists of 1,095 people. That is about 91 percent of the survey's original sample. We express Kenyan's voting behaviour as in the following logistic equation:

$$\text{Odds Ratio (voting for Kibaki)}_i = \frac{1}{1 + \exp(-x_i(\beta))} = \beta_0 + \beta_n x_n + u_i \quad \text{eq(6)}$$

in which the dependent variable is whether the survey respondent indicated whether they would vote for Kibaki in the 2007 Presidential election or not. The β_n coefficients measure the effects of the factors x_n (such as ethnicity and policy issues) on the probability of voting for Kibaki and u_i represents the error term.

We estimate equation (6) by adding sequentially a number of factors that might have influenced Kenyans' voting intentions. The overall results are presented in Tables 1-3 in the appendix. The regression coefficients are presented as odds ratios. The odds ratio tells us by how much the odds of voting for Kibaki change for each unit change in the independent variable. An odds ratio of less than one indicates that the odds decrease as the independent variable increases. An odds ratio of equal to one indicates that the odds do not change as the independent variable increases. An odds ratio of greater than one indicates that the odds increase as the dependent variable increases.

Ethnicity

Kibaki speaking after his first Presidential election in 2002 welcomed his victory saying "Kenyans of every group, every race, every creed have embarked on a journey to a promising future." A wave of democratic optimism swept Kenyans as Kibaki and the NARC, the multi-tribe alliance that backed his election, promised to out-root political tribalism. Five years later, there

were serious doubts at home and internationally about the unity Kenyans felt in the 2007 elections, and whether Kenyans voted merely along ethnic lines.

In an attempt to assess the role of ethnicity in the 2007 elections we estimate a logistic regression the extent to which the intentions to vote for Kibaki were influenced by ethnicity, with and without controlling for any other factors.

We define ethnic groups based on how survey respondents answered the question: “What is your tribe?” All survey respondents answered this question, mentioning in total twenty three tribes. From these, we included our regression analysis only the major ethnic groups mentioned: Kikuyu, Luhya, Luo, Kamba, Kalenjin, Embu/Meru, Kisii, Mijikenda and Somali. These groups account for 90 percent of our survey’s original sample. These tribes also account for 90 percent of the population according to the latest Kenyan Census.

In the logistic regression we introduce each ethnic group as a dummy variable. This facilitates interpreting the regression coefficients and also allows us to identify which ethnic alliances are more salient. The results of this model are shown in Table 1 under the column “Model 1”.

The estimated coefficients suggest that the Kenyan electorate is divided. Voting intention of Luhya, Kamba, Kisii and Mijikenda do not appear to be shaped by their ethnic group. However, voting intentions of the rest of main tribal groups, roughly 40 percent of survey respondents, were influenced by their ethnic origin. Specifically, the Luo and Kalenjin were less likely to vote for Kibaki. In contrast, the Kikuyu, Embu/Meru and Somalis, were most likely to vote for Kibaki. In both cases, the salience of tribe of origin is statistically significant. For instance, people from Kikuyu origin were 24 times more likely to vote for Kibaki than those who were not Kikuyu.

These findings suggest that a large percentage of Kenyan voters intended to vote along ethnic lines. However, before making any sound conclusions, we need to control for other factors

that could impact on voting intention. Otherwise, the logistic model just shown could be misspecified, resulting in having biased regression coefficients.

Age

In addition to one's ethnic group, there are many other axis of identification. Age, education level, religion, region, occupation, etc. could be used as basis of identity. Thus, we proceed to estimate the effect of other socio-economic factors in shaping Kenyan voting intentions.

We begin by investigating the effect of a potential "generation divide" in voting behaviour. Kenyan's population is overwhelming young. More than half of Kenyan's total population is aged 18 or under and according to our survey 63 percent of Kenyan electorate are aged 18-34. Every generation sees the past through the lens of its own time. Young Kenyans might feel less nostalgia for the era of former president Daniel Moi than the older generations. Also, younger Kenyans have enjoyed the benefits from democracy and have been encouraged to be part of the generational change.⁹

As shown in Model 2, we found statistically significant evidence to suggest that age influenced voting intentions. Specifically, we found that those aged 18-39 were less likely to vote for Kibaki, than those aged 40 or older. This evidence suggests that Kenyan's old and young generations might hold different political preferences.¹⁰

Education

We continue by testing the impact of education level on intentions to vote. Education could be an important part of one's identity. Education might proxy for the opportunities that people have enjoyed and it can influence job opportunities hence living conditions that people might face. Further, people's education level can give them different understanding and access to political

⁹ The Institute for Education in Democracy claims that the number of registered young voters went up by one million thanks to the encouragement of young people to participate in the democratic process. The active participation of the young generations was also experienced in the 2007 MPs election where more people under the age of 35 contended for parliamentary and civic seats than ever before.

¹⁰ Later, we investigate more specifically on the role of generations in voting behaviour as shown in Table2.

information. In Kenya in particular, people's education is likely to have influenced voting intentions. For instance, Odinga played on the grievances that educated but unemployed people might feel as he argued that the "...relatively well educated Kenyans are still excluded from the growth process." (ODM 2007, p.9)

As shown in Model 2, we find that Kenyans with secondary level of education and above are significantly less likely to vote for Kibaki than those with primary education or not at all.

Religion

It has been speculated in the media that religion -another important aspect of one's identity- might have played an important role in the 2007 elections. The media pointed out that some religious leaders -from various faiths- encouraged their followers to cast their votes for specific candidates. Also, religion was used in political campaigning, as an instrument to divide Kenyans. However, we find no evidence to suggest that religion affected voting intentions. As shown in Table 3 (Models 1-3) we tested people's religion as a dummy variable, using different groupings (such as Christians and Muslims) but these are not statistically significant.

Other Socio-Economic Identities

Occupation could be an important part of one's identity. How we earn our living reflects our economic interests and socio-economic status. In some cases, occupations such as farmers or teachers, through their unions, establish strong political cleavages with political parties. In our regression (shown in Table 3) we find no evidence that people's occupation played a statistically significant role in influencing voting intentions.

We next turn to test for the effect of unemployment on voter intentions. Kenya suffers from unemployment crises. The unemployment rate reaches 40 per cent according to official figures (World Fact). This coincides with our survey's results, where 43 percent of respondents stated that they were unemployed. Given the extent of unemployment, one could argue that likelihood of voting for Kibaki could be negatively affected by one's labor market status. We find

that those who are unemployed are less likely to vote for Kibaki. However, this relationship is not statistically significant.

As part of one's identity, we finally test for whether voting intentions differed depending whether voters live in rural or urban areas. We find that people living in urban areas were less likely to vote for Kibaki, but this relationship is not statistically significant.

Grievances

We now focus here on assessing the importance of grievances that might have induced Kenyans to (not) vote for Kibaki. Kibaki's administration has irrefutably delivered economic progress. However, such progress could be discounted if Kenyans hold grievances against his leadership. Specifically, we test for the effects of two sources of grievances on voting intentions: generalized- and individual-grievance.

Firstly we test for generalized-grievance. We use this term to refer to the situation where voters consider Kibaki's government as having not improved the treatment of all Kenyans - regardless of their ethnic group- compared to previous governments. According to our survey, the majority of Kenyans (55 percent) state that Kibaki's government had not made improvements in treating all groups in Kenya equally and fairly compared to previous regimes. When including this generalized-grievance in our logistic regression we find that it significantly affects voter intentions. As shown in Model 3 (Table 1) Kenyans that felt that Kibaki's government has not improved the treatment of all groups fairly were less likely to vote for him.

Secondly, we test the importance of individual-grievance. This refers to the voters perceptions on how their specific living conditions have fared with Kibaki's administration. To assess this we asked respondents how they rated their living conditions compared to other Kenyans. This question puts into perspective whether voter's conditions -compared to others- have fared during Kibaki's government in office. It also reflects about Kenyan's beliefs and attitudes about economic inequality in the society. We find that Kenyans were less likely to vote

for Kibaki if they considered their economic conditions to be no better than the rest of Kenyans (Model 3, Table 1).

In summary, we find that generalized- and individual-grievances reduce the likelihood of voting for Kibaki. It is also worth noting how the importance of ethnic origin change when measures of grievance are introduced in the logistic analysis. When measures of grievances, are included in the specification, the odds ratios of tribal origin for the Kikuyus, Embu/Meru weaken compared to the first and second model. The tribal origin for the Luos is weakened as well. In contrast, for the Kambas, when grievances are taken into account, their tribal identity becomes salient and statistically significant.

Access to Public and Private Goods

Even if voters notice that economic conditions delivered by the government have an effect on their lives, this need not influence their voting behaviour. At least, that is what previous research has found on voting behaviour in Kenya. To test this hypothesis we examine whether voting intentions were influenced by Kibaki's track record with respect to provision of public goods and services. We also examine whether partisan predisposition against Kibaki's party (PNU) impacted on how voters evaluated his performance and hence on their voting intentions.

We start by examining the views on Kibaki's performance in the recent past, specifically a year before the elections. In that year, Kenya achieved an economic growth of 6 percent, the highest rate of growth of Kibaki's administration. In fact, that was the highest economic rate that Kenya has achieved in decades. Nonetheless, Kenya also experienced serious droughts in the year ahead of the elections. This produced severe shortages of water, and a fall in agriculture production in a country that is still mainly rural. Hence, differences in the fortunes of Kenyans might have increased.

Our survey shows that a third of respondents disapproved Kibaki's performance during the year before the election. We find that Kenyans are less likely to vote for Kibaki if they disapproved the overall performance of the government. To unravel the factors that influenced

voters to disapprove Kibaki's performance, we test whether deprivation of basic necessities during the year before the election affected voting behaviour. We focus on whether respondents' experienced shortages of each of six goods: food, water, medicines, cash to pay for school expenses, fuel to cook and water. We find no statistically significant evidence to suggest measures of deprivation influence voter intentions (Model 4).¹¹

We next assess the views on Kibaki's performance in the more distant past. For many Kenyans, Kibaki's presidential victory in 2002 represented hope for a change from Moi's rule. In our regression we added a dummy variable to account for whether survey respondents preferred Kibaki's leadership to that of the immediate former President Daniel Moi. The question was phrased as: "Looking back, how do you compare President Kibaki's performance with President Moi's performance with regard to the following matters?" The list includes nine policies. We focus our analysis on the three main policies of Kibaki's administration: "your living standards", "the availability of jobs" and "the cost of sending your children to school."

As shown in Model 5, we find that Kenyans are more likely to vote for Kibaki if they prefer Kibaki's performance to Moi's in terms of living conditions and jobs. It might appear contradictory that we find Kenyans value Kibaki's achievement in creating jobs, despite the still high unemployment rate in the country (43 percent according to our sample). As mentioned earlier, we found that those who were unemployed were less likely to vote for Kibaki, although this effect was not statistically significant. Perhaps voters that perceived an improvement in creating of jobs with respect to Moi's rule are primarily those who were employed at the time of the survey. To test for this, we added an interaction term of views on Kibaki's job creation record and the unemployment status of respondents. We found that this term is not statistically significant, meaning, that, regardless of whether people are unemployed or not, they still value

¹¹ We also construct an "economic shortage-index" which considers whether people experienced a shortage of any of these six goods. Again, we find a non- statistically significant effect of this economic shortage-index on voting intentions. Thus, material deprivation does not appear to be an important factor influencing voter's choices.

the improvements in jobs prospects brought by Kibaki's administration. In other words, even if people are unemployed, the fact that there are more jobs available signals to them that the chances of being employed in the future are good.

Perhaps a more surprising result is that despite of Kibaki's administration making good of the pledge to provide free primary education, we find no statistically significant effect on the (lowered) cost of sending children to school on voting intentions. According to our survey, only a third of respondents have children enrolled in primary school (28 percent in public school and 9 percent in private school). Hence, the provision of free primary school might be valued only among those who currently benefit. In fact, we find that provision of free primary school becomes statistically significant only when we interact the cost of education with having a child in primary school (public or private). In other words, voters do not value the provision of school as a public good, but they do so only when this is perceived as a "private good", something that benefits them directly.

One could argue that people from some ethnic-groups (such as Luo and Kalenjin) did not intend to vote for Kibaki because they discounted Kibaki's track record. To assess this, in Table 3 we split our sample in three sub-groups according to people's ethnicity. Specifically, in Model 1 we analyse all Kenyans except three tribes: the Kikuyu, Embu and Meru, whilst we analyse these three ethnic groups, specifically in Model 2. In Model 3 we study the voting intentions of Luo and Kalenjin only. We find that these three sub-groups have similar voting behaviour. However, provision of free primary education influenced voting for Kibaki, only among those of Kikuyu and Embu/Meru origin.

Partisan predispositions

So far we have assessed the impact of perceptions on Kibaki's track record on voting behaviour. Voters' perceptions on economic performance can be contradicted by actual changes in national economic conditions. These biases in perception may stem from people's partisan ideology. People with weaker attachments to the incumbent political party might perceive the national

economy more negatively. According to our survey, 59 percent of survey respondents feel very distant to a political party, and 39 percent feel very distant in particular to Kibaki's party, PNU. To test for this hypothesis we add interaction terms on views on economic policies by whether people feel distant to Kibaki's party.

We find that people who feel very distant to PNU, are less likely to vote for Kibaki and this relationship is statistically significant (with an odds ratio of .04) as shown in Table 1 (Model 8). The three interaction terms, on living conditions, jobs and provision of free primary education are not statistically significant, hence not included in the regressions. This finding suggests that Kenyans broadly valued economic policies, regardless of how distant they felt to Kibaki's political party.

Overall, the evidence presented suggests that Kenyans voters behaviour are economically motivated, with retrospective interests, valuing access to public and private goods. This evidence contrast with that of previous studies that show Kenyans rather than voting economically, are just identity voters (Ndegwa 2003; Holmquist 2005; Logan, Wolf and Sentamu 2007).

Corruption

We also test for another main policy of Kibaki's administration: War on corruption. Kibaki's administration focused on strengthening Kenya's legal and institutional framework. For instance, his administration established the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission (KACC) as independent body, the Kenya National Audit Office, and an independent National Anti-Corruption Campaign Committee. But, despite these legal advances, Kibaki received criticism at home and abroad for not doing enough to fight corruption. For instance, the ODM argued that:

Of all the transgressions of the Kibaki presidency there is only one that towers above all else and that is his acceptance of corruption -past and present- advocating zero-tolerance at the swearing-in ceremony and now tolerating it one hundred percent...President Kibaki within months of his presidency completed his set of betrayals by letting the international down whom he had assured that he would eliminate corruption. (ODM 2007, p.15-16)

Perceptions on the extent of corruption might have lowered Kibaki's credibility hence his chances for being re-elected. As shown previously, 24 percent of our survey respondents considered the honesty of candidates as the most important factor for selecting a presidential candidate. In a separate question, we ask Kenyans the extent to which they think Kibaki's presidency was involved in corruption. The majority of respondents (58 percent) think that only a few officials in the presidential office were involved in corruption. Nonetheless, the rest of respondents (42 percent) think that all or most of the members of the presidential office were involved in corruption.

In our logistic regression we include perceptions of corruption in the presidential office on voting intentions (Model 6). The results show that Kenyans that thought that there was much corruption in the presidency were less likely to vote for Kibaki as compared to those who thought that there was not much corruption. This effect is statistically significant and with an odds ratio of 0.43.

Referendum

As we glimpsed in Section IV, the unresolved Constitutional debate seemed to have divided Kenyans in the 2005 referendum and also in the 2007 elections. This is confirmed in our results shown by Model 7. We find that Kenyans that voted in favour of the 2005 referendum reaffirmed their trust in Kibaki. Specifically we find that those who voted in favour of the referendum were 7.1 times more likely to vote for Kibaki than those who voted against the referendum. Model 7 also shows that those who did not vote in the referendum, were 2.1 times more likely to vote for Kibaki than those who voted against the referendum. The results suggest that the constitutional debate was the single most influential factor in shaping voting intentions, after the ethnicity of respondents.

Group self-interest and voting behavior

So far we have analysed how on average various factors shaped voting intentions of Kenyans. Although this analysis allow us to make broad generalizations, it might ignore that voting behaviour might have differed in some groups. Voter heterogeneity, for instance with respect to how Kenyans identify themselves, can cause a systematic bias in voting behaviour, aggregate economic valuations and perceptions on grievances. To better take into account the impact of voter heterogeneity, we focus on analysing the voting behaviour of a number of sub-groups. We analyse separately the voting behaviour of the young and old generations, as well as how Kenyans identify themselves—either on the basis of their ethnicity, occupation or on nationalistic terms. The results of these analyses are presented in Table 2.

Generation Divide

We start our analysis of sub-groups by analysing whether voting behaviour differed across generations. To do so, we re-run our analysis but splitting the sample into those aged 18-39 and those aged 40 and over. As shown in table 2 (Model 12 and 13), we find that the relationship between ethnicity and voting intentions -positive or negative- remains the same among the young and old generations. However, the strength and statistical significance of this relationship differs across generations. For example, ethnicity matters more in influencing the voting intentions of the old than young Kikuyus. Specifically, for the young generations, people of Kikuyu origin are 6 times more likely to vote for Kibaki than those young non Kikuyus. For the older generations, Kikuyus are 169 times more likely to vote for Kibaki than those older non Kikuyus. The same pattern is found for the Embu/Meru. However, the effect of being of Embu/Meru is not statistically significant among the old generations. For Luos and Kambas, their tribe of origin is statistically significant in influencing voting intentions, but only among the young. This result of young Luos and Kambas practicing identity politics is rather surprising and may reflect identification with the respective presidential candidates.

We can infer that tribe influenced voting behaviour differently across generations. Our results also show that old and young generations hold different voting attitudes. In contrast to

older generations, young people's voting intention are not influenced by their education, disapproval of Kibaki's performance, provision of free primary education or by views on corruption. The only resemblance in voting behaviour between the young and old generations is their views on the referendum and preference of living conditions under Kibaki's versus Moi's rule.

Ethnic Group as Main Identity

We now turn attention to investigating voting behavior based on how Kenyans identify themselves. For this analysis, we split the survey sample according to the self-expressed main identity of respondents. In Model 14, we first examine the voting behavior of those who identify themselves first and foremost on the basis of their ethnic origin. According to our survey, twenty percent of survey respondents identify in this way. We first focus on studying the strength of people's ethnicity on voting intentions. We find that Kikuyus are approximately 17 times more likely to vote for Kibaki than non-Kikuyus.¹² The strength of this relationship is stronger than the one reported in Table 1 in Model 7 (which controls for the same factors as in Model 14) but that includes all survey respondents likely to vote. In Model 14 we also observe that people from Kamba origin are less likely to vote for Kibaki, as we had seen in Models 3 to 7 in Table 1. For this group of people who identify on ethnic basis, the provision of jobs is the only other factor that is important in influencing their voting behavior, other than ethnic group. Hence, the voting behavior of this group of people is different than the "average Kenyan" (as analyzed in Table 1). Their ethnic identity is so strong that all other issues do not seem to influence their voting behavior.

Occupation as Main Identity

¹² In Model 14 it not possible to quantify the extent to which the origin of Embu/Meru and Luo influence their voting intention. This is because there is no variability in the dependent variable (whether to vote or not for Kibaki) within these two groups. In other words, the tribe origin for these two groups predicts perfectly the intention to vote (or not to vote in case of the Luos) for Kibaki.

The reason why people might identify on occupation basis could be because they have found channels, other than their own ethnic group, to exercise and express their political and economic interests. In Model 15 we examine the voting behavior of those who identify themselves first and foremost in terms of their occupation, which represent 18 percent of the sample. As anticipated, for this group of voters, ethnicity does not influence their voting intentions. This group was in fact the only one whose ethnicity did not affect voting intentions among the various sub-groups of populations analyzed. For this group, the most important factors that influence their voting intentions are their economic and political interests. Moreover, this group places more weight on their living conditions, corruption and how they voted in the referendum than any other group.

Nationalism: An Illusion of Unity?

The crucial importance of building a national identity, Amartya Sen argues, lies in its constructive political and civil role. A national identity can combat the divisions created by having groups identified with one key trait -such as ethnicity- and embracing a broader, richer and more complex understanding of ourselves (Sen 2006). In Model 16 we turn our attention to examining the voting behavior of those identified first and foremost in nationalistic terms –that is, referred themselves as Kenyans. The hypothesis to test is whether the ethnic origin among this group did not intermediate in their voting intentions. Surprisingly our results reveal a different picture. For Kikuyus and Embu/Merus, ethnicity is the most important factor shaping voting intentions than for any other group. For example, the odds ratio coefficient show that among those who identified themselves as Kenyans, Kikuyus are 119 times more likely to vote for Kibaki than people from other groups. Those of Embu/Meru origin are 14 times more likely to vote for Kibaki. These odds ratios for these two tribes are the largest than any our previous models. This result begs one question. What exactly people understand by identifying themselves as Kenyans? Could it be case that people identified as Kenyan referring to their own tribe -excluding other tribes- as their nation? Or could it mean that those from a Kikuyu and Embu/Meru origin strongly

feel that Kibaki was more capable than the opposition in delivering a comprehensive and inclusive development to *all Kenyans*, regardless of which tribe one comes from?

Overall, the analysis presented here reveals that population sub-groups exhibit very different voting behavior. We observe asymmetries in reactions to economic indicators across voters. These reactions appear to be motivated by how Kenyans identify themselves first and foremost and not so much by their socio-economic characteristics. As Table 4 shows, Kenyans' that identify on tribal, nationalistic or occupation basis have in general similar characteristics.

VII. Conclusions

This paper has provided a detailed analysis of key factors that influenced voter preferences during the 2007 Kenyan elections. We provide evidence of the rational voter hypothesis using a rich dataset of voter characteristics and revealed preferences. We find that, while ethnicity is important, it is but one of other factors such as policy performance of the incumbent, economic conditions, etc. that influence voter preferences. Furthermore, we find that how Kenyans identify themselves is itself an important determinant of voting choices. We generally find that the society is politically polarized which may be reflective perceptions of isolation either politically/and or economically. While we have not made a direct connection between polarization and post-election violence, we can infer that such polarization can indeed trigger violence.

An indication from the survey is that the constitutional reform debate remains central to the issues dividing Kenyans. We suggest that the many issues that seem to divide Kenyans may be dealt with through a constitutional reform process. In particular, there seems to be widespread perceptions of unfairness. Such perceptions of discrimination, real or imaginary, can cause grievances that translate into conflicts. The results provided in this paper offer insights into some of the issues that divide Kenyans and which could be harmonized in a constitution.

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Figure 1. Self-Described Voting Motivations




Figure 2. Voting Intentions by People's Tribe of Origin




Figure 3. Voting Intentions by Kenyan's Main Identify




Figure 4. Voting Intentions by Kibaki's Approval Rating




Figure 5. Voting Intentions by how People's Perceive their Living Conditions




Figure 6. Voting Intentions by How People Voted in 2005 Referendum




Table 1. Probability of Voting for Kibaki

| | | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 | Model 5 | Model 6 | Model 7 | Model 8 |
|---|--|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Ethnic Origins | Kikuyu | 23.510*** (7.528) | 24.945*** (8.261) | 20.622*** (7.119) | 21.394*** (8.504) | 16.319*** (6.565) | 16.127*** (6.891) | 7.757*** (3.378) | 8.189*** (3.988) |
| | Embu/Meru | 19.500*** (7.401) | 20.030*** (7.831) | 15.714*** (6.426) | 13.059*** (5.976) | 11.521*** (5.478) | 10.358*** (5.192) | 4.975** (2.678) | 6.204** (3.619) |
| | Somali | 3.257** (1.339) | 3.092** (1.317) | 3.572** (1.735) | 4.056* (2.461) | 3.355* (2.048) | 3.203 (2.090) | 2.782 (1.864) | 1.893 (1.113) |
| | Luo | 0.099*** (0.050) | 0.101*** (0.051) | 0.132*** (0.067) | 0.174** (0.102) | 0.191** (0.106) | 0.253* (0.146) | 0.228* (0.139) | 0.311 (0.220) |
| | Kalenjin | 0.444* (0.162) | 0.436* (0.164) | 0.390* (0.159) | 0.530 (0.242) | 0.430 (0.208) | 0.469 (0.239) | 0.466 (0.263) | 0.535 (0.328) |
| | Kamba | 0.582 (0.197) | 0.577 (0.198) | 0.435* (0.158) | 0.509 (0.214) | 0.325** (0.135) | 0.355* (0.163) | 0.210** (0.102) | 0.197** (0.101) |
| | Luhya | 0.791 (0.232) | 0.811 (0.248) | 0.926 (0.294) | 1.329 (0.498) | 0.796 (0.307) | 0.889 (0.375) | 0.723 (0.308) | 1.007 (0.509) |
| | Kissi | 0.908 (0.296) | 1.008 (0.339) | 1.094 (0.390) | 1.456 (0.585) | 1.299 (0.556) | 1.370 (0.640) | 1.168 (0.575) | 1.939 (0.997) |
| | Mijikenda | 0.874 (0.313) | 0.854 (0.318) | 0.819 (0.317) | 1.085 (0.462) | 0.781 (0.367) | 0.859 (0.477) | 0.677 (0.359) | 0.619 (0.359) |
| Age (18-39) | | | 0.639* (0.120) | 0.551** (0.109) | 0.581* (0.129) | 0.562* (0.128) | 0.540* (0.133) | 0.557* (0.157) | 0.673 (0.210) |
| Education (Secondary and higher) | | | 0.717 (0.131) | 0.640* (0.127) | 0.685 (0.146) | 0.496** (0.119) | 0.562* (0.149) | 0.569* (0.160) | 0.580 (0.173) |
| Government has treated all groups same/worse | | | | 0.314*** (0.057) | 0.414*** (0.086) | 0.382*** (0.081) | 0.471** (0.108) | 0.469** (0.115) | 0.524* (0.143) |
| Respondent's living conditions worse/same than other Kenyans | | | | 0.370*** (0.070) | 0.423*** (0.093) | 0.524** (0.120) | 0.549* (0.135) | 0.611 (0.166) | 0.448* (0.173) |
| Dissapprove Kibaki's performance in last 12 months | | | | | 0.215*** (0.060) | | 0.371** (0.127) | 0.381* (0.150) | 0.673 (0.185) |
| Last year did not have enough: | Food | | | | 0.632* (0.147) | | | | |
| | Money for paying children's school expenses ^a | | | | 0.995 (0.242) | | | | |
| Prefer Kibaki's to Moi's performance: | Living conditions | | | | | 2.517*** (0.572) | 2.395*** (0.588) | 2.271** (0.624) | 2.403** (0.691) |
| | Jobs | | | | | 1.820* (0.425) | 1.641* (0.409) | 1.464 (0.397) | 1.191 (0.336) |
| | Cost of education ^a | | | | | 1.727* (0.407) | 1.735* (0.448) | 1.717 (0.490) | 2.042* (0.621) |
| There is Much Corruption in Presidency | | | | | | | 0.438*** (0.107) | 0.432** (0.115) | 0.449** (0.127) |
| Referendum (Voted against) | Voted in favour | | | | | | | 7.133*** (2.412) | 5.479*** (1.862) |
| | Didn't vote | | | | | | | 2.251** (0.643) | 2.253** (0.684) |
| Feel very distant to PNU | | | | | | | | | 0.040*** (0.023) |
| Constant | | 0.389*** (0.087) | 0.664 (0.178) | 2.863** (0.979) | 2.883** (1.126) | 1.236 (0.555) | 0.719 (0.384) | 0.441 (0.248) | 0.478 (0.311) |
| Likelihood Ratio | | 545.91 | 534.65 | 593.79 | 565.50 | 486.10 | 508.56 | 552.10 | 595.48 |
| R-squared | | 0.36 | 0.36 | 0.42 | 0.46 | 0.44 | 0.48 | 0.53 | 0.59 |
| N (Likely to vote) | | 1095 | 1072 | 1036 | 886 | 778 | 745 | 733 | 733 |

Coefficients as Odds Ratio. Significance Level, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Robust Standard Errors in parentheses.^a Given that respondents have children in primary school (public or private)

Table 2. Probability of Voting for Kibaki by Identity

| | | Sample split according to people's tribe | | | Generation Divide | | Only those that First and Foremost Identity as | | |
|--|--|--|------------------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------|--|-----------------------|-------------------------|
| | | All except: Kikuyu, Embu/Meru | Only Kikuyu, Embu/Meru | Only Luo and Kalenjin | Only those aged 18-39 | Only those aged 40 + | Tribe | Occupation/ Class | Kenyan |
| | | Model 9 | Model 10 | Model 11 | Model 12 | Model 13 | Model 14 | Model 15 | Model 16 |
| Ethnic Origins | Kikuyu | | | | 6.226*** (2.836) | 169.258* (380.595) | 16.995** (18.438) | 1.706 (1.684) | 163.952*** (180.093) |
| | Embu/Meru | | | | 4.399** (2.442) | 31.158 (58.115) | 0.128* (0.130) | 0.506 (0.592) | 11.200* (10.513) |
| | Somali | 3.335 (2.224) | | | 2.696 (1.977) | 1.163 (1.706) | 3.214 (4.151) | 0.855 (1.336) | |
| | Luo | 0.211* (0.137) | | | 0.101* (0.112) | 0.414 (0.708) | | 0.275 (0.259) | 0.034** (0.039) |
| | Kalenjin | 0.481 (0.272) | | | 0.521 (0.372) | 0.144 (0.212) | 0.665 (0.744) | 0.772 (0.875) | 0.171* (0.146) |
| | Kamba | 0.142*** (0.075) | | | 0.163** (0.097) | 0.055 (0.087) | 0.113* (0.119) | 0.227 (0.252) | 0.072** (0.067) |
| | Luhya | 0.637 (0.276) | | | 0.664 (0.320) | 0.773 (1.044) | 0.680 (0.667) | 0.472 (0.515) | 1.179 (0.855) |
| | Kissi | 1.083 (0.548) | | | 0.981 (0.512) | 2.805 (4.468) | 0.772 (0.736) | 0.273 (0.404) | 1.117 (0.956) |
| | Mijikenda | 0.658 (0.356) | | | 0.901 (0.568) | 0.221 (0.334) | 0.175 (0.190) | 1.797 (2.548) | 1.194 (0.823) |
| | Age (18-39) | 0.622 (0.212) | 0.801 (0.252) | 0.680 (0.193) | | | 0.870 (0.585) | 0.921 (0.558) | 0.253* (0.15) |
| | Education (Secondary and higher) | 0.617 (0.194) | 0.514* (0.147) | 0.745 (0.192) | 0.750 (0.242) | 0.046** (0.048) | 0.278 (0.223) | 0.371 (0.237) | 0.385 (0.216) |
| | Government has treated all groups same/worse | 0.380*** (0.109) | 0.508* (0.140) | 0.461*** (0.105) | 0.501* (0.139) | 0.321 (0.238) | 0.502 (0.276) | 1.265 (0.703) | 0.217** (0.111) |
| | Respondent's living conditions worse/same than other Kenyans | 0.448 (0.197) | 0.408* (0.153) | 0.261*** (0.092) | 0.249** (0.126) | 1.324 (1.134) | 0.393 (0.325) | 0.290 (0.195) | 0.094* (0.103) |
| Prefer Kibaki's to Moi's performance: | Dissapprove Kibaki's performance in last 12 months | 0.743 (0.251) | 0.815 (0.232) | 0.632 (0.149) | 0.854 (0.257) | 0.037** (0.039) | 0.414 (0.269) | 0.552 (0.275) | 0.689 (0.418) |
| | Living conditions | 1.899* (0.606) | 2.537** (0.734) | 3.114*** (0.776) | 1.954* (0.645) | 7.742* (6.392) | 3.995 (3.330) | 3.754* (2.080) | 2.336 (1.506) |
| | Jobs | 2.163* (0.677) | 1.320 (0.367) | 0.985 (0.232) | 1.461 (0.445) | 1.834 (1.400) | 4.014* (2.540) | 1.020 (0.663) | 1.669 (0.908) |
| | Cost of education ^a | 1.791 (0.599) | 2.087* (0.635) | 1.491 (0.406) | 1.879 (0.623) | 5.123* (4.220) | 2.521 (2.091) | 2.568 (1.491) | 0.771 (0.526) |
| | There is Much Corruption in Presidency | 0.542* (0.168) | 0.293** (0.158) | 0.024*** (0.040) | 0.581 (0.178) | 0.048** (0.041) | 1.391 (0.911) | 0.115*** (0.070) | 0.672 (0.362) |
| | Referendum (Voted against) | 11.934*** (5.343) | 8.826*** (3.348) | 11.449*** (3.311) | 4.947*** (1.909) | 30.696** (33.067) | 3.791 (3.411) | 26.154*** (21.863) | 47.495*** (37.163) |
| | Didn't vote | 2.365* (0.791) | 2.670** (0.827) | 2.411*** (0.629) | 1.899* (0.579) | 21.015** (21.750) | 0.521 (0.452) | 11.105*** (6.393) | 2.735 (1.498) |
| | Constant | 0.398 (0.262) | 0.148*** (0.083) | 0.417 (0.196) | 0.288* (0.171) | 0.245 (0.428) | 1.462 (1.771) | 0.067 (0.101) | 1.329 (1.331) |
| | Likelihood Ratio | 200.78 | 159.02 | 314.38 | 364.42 | 207.32 | 55.26 | 152.94 | 152.94 |
| | R-squared | 0.37 | 0.30 | 0.38 | 0.50 | 0.74 | 0.41 | 0.55 | 0.55 |
| | N (Likely to vote) | 476 | 476 | 608 | 530 | 203 | 99 | 201 | 286 |

Coefficients as Odds Ratio. Significance Level, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Robust Standard Errors in parentheses.^a Given that respondents have children in primary school (public or private)

Table 3. Probability of Voting for Kibaki by Socio-Economic-identities

| | | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 | Model 5 | Model 6 | Model 7 |
|--|-----------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|
| Ethnic Origins | Kikuyu | 22.527*** (7.453) | 23.151*** (7.655) | 22.562*** (7.564) | 24.406*** (7.748) | 23.989*** (7.808) | 23.075*** (7.469) | 25.316*** (8.452) |
| | Embu/Meru | 18.592*** (7.181) | 19.167*** (7.407) | 18.130*** (7.012) | 19.949*** (7.671) | 19.947*** (7.638) | 18.764*** (7.143) | 28.106*** (12.269) |
| | Somali | 3.735** (1.900) | 3.765** (1.915) | 3.569* (1.859) | 3.187** (1.327) | 3.661** (1.541) | 2.995* (1.339) | 2.575* (1.181) |
| | Luo | 0.093*** (0.048) | 0.094*** (0.048) | 0.090*** (0.046) | 0.106*** (0.054) | 0.103*** (0.053) | 0.080*** (0.044) | 0.084*** (0.047) |
| | Kalenjin | 0.429* (0.158) | 0.428* (0.158) | 0.391* (0.148) | 0.399* (0.153) | 0.465* (0.170) | 0.405* (0.151) | 0.469* (0.174) |
| | Kamba | 0.573 (0.200) | 0.569 (0.198) | 0.561 (0.196) | 0.579 (0.200) | 0.569 (0.196) | 0.569 (0.193) | 0.634 (0.224) |
| | Luhya | 0.765 (0.228) | 0.776 (0.231) | 0.736 (0.222) | 0.866 (0.258) | 0.823 (0.244) | 0.775 (0.230) | 0.714 (0.223) |
| | Kissi | 0.809 (0.299) | 0.821 (0.301) | 0.789 (0.289) | 0.934 (0.307) | 0.952 (0.313) | 0.933 (0.307) | 0.890 (0.305) |
| | Mijikenda | 0.916 (0.334) | 0.926 (0.334) | 0.869 (0.317) | 0.857 (0.314) | 0.868 (0.318) | 0.884 (0.317) | 0.978 (0.360) |
| Religion (Catholic base group) | Protetant | 0.845 (0.177) | | | | | | |
| | Christian | 1.185 (0.336) | | | | | | |
| | Mulim | 0.806 (0.335) | | | | | | |
| | Other | 1.115 (0.330) | | | | | | |
| Religion (Christians broadly defined base group) | Muslim | | 0.850 (0.338) | 0.857 (0.345) | | | | |
| | Others | | 1.173 (0.330) | 1.126 (0.322) | | | | |
| Received a lot info from religious leaders | | | | 0.957 (0.196) | | | | |
| Occupation (Agrarian base group) | Worker | | | | 1.051 (0.242) | | | |
| | Professional | | | | 0.902 (0.195) | | | |
| | Student | | | | 1.448 (0.664) | | | |
| | Housewife | | | | 0.597 (0.283) | | | |
| | Never had a job | | | | 0.925 (0.287) | | | |
| Unemployed | | | | | | 0.919 (0.158) | | |
| Trust somewhat/a lot Kenyans from other ethnic groups | | | | | | | 1.191 (0.205) | |
| Feel very distant to a political party | | | | | | | | 0.860 (0.161) |
| Constant | | 0.417** (0.112) | 0.392*** (0.093) | 0.420*** (0.102) | 0.393*** (0.100) | 0.391*** (0.095) | 0.310*** (0.105) | 0.430** (0.113) |
| Likelihood Ratio | | 535.94 | 534.33 | 528.04 | 534.29 | 534.82 | 527.79 | 524.28 |
| R-squared | | 0.36 | 0.36 | 0.36 | 0.37 | 0.36 | 0.37 | 0.39 |
| N (Likely to vote) | | 1095 | 1095 | 1073 | 1080 | 1086 | 1067 | 1003 |

Coefficients as Odds Ratio. Significance Level, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Robust Standard Errors in parentheses.

Table 4. Characteristic of Kenyans by Identity Group

| | Average | Tribe | Occupation/ Class | Kenyans |
|---|---------|-------|----------------------|---------|
| Tribe | | | | |
| Kikuyu | 19.5 | 28.7 | 28.7 | 19.2 |
| Luhya | 14.0 | 12.5 | 12.7 | 14.9 |
| Luo | 12.3 | 11.8 | 12.0 | 12.1 |
| Kamba | 9.4 | 6.5 | 6.2 | 9.4 |
| Kalenjin | 8.7 | 11.1 | 11.3 | 8.7 |
| Kissi | 8.4 | 8.2 | 8.4 | 8.3 |
| Embumeru | 9.4 | 5.4 | 5.5 | 9.2 |
| Mijikenda | 6.1 | 3.6 | 3.3 | 6.2 |
| Somali | 3.1 | 3.6 | 3.3 | 3.1 |
| Age | | | | |
| 18-39 | 73.9 | 71.5 | 74.4 | 76.3 |
| 40 + | 26.1 | 28.5 | 25.6 | 23.7 |
| Education | | | | |
| Primary or Less | 28.7 | 32.4 | 26.9 | 23.2 |
| Secondary/High school | 46.2 | 42.1 | 43.7 | 51.7 |
| Post-secondary qualifications | 25.1 | 25.5 | 29.4 | 25.1 |
| Occupation | | | | |
| Agrarian | 25.7 | 29.0 | 17.6 | 27.3 |
| Worker | 23.5 | 22.4 | 24.5 | 23.7 |
| Professional | 34.5 | 33.2 | 41.7 | 33.1 |
| Student | 3.0 | 2.3 | 3.2 | 2.9 |
| Housewife | 5.9 | 4.7 | 7.2 | 6.5 |
| Never had a job | 7.3 | 8.4 | 5.8 | 6.5 |
| Partisan predispositions | | | | |
| Feel distant to PNU | 27.8 | 29.1 | 25.1 | 28.5 |
| Setting | | | | |
| Rural | 60.0 | 61.1 | 52.3 | 61.4 |
| Urban | 40.0 | 38.9 | 47.7 | 38.6 |
| Living conditions rated to other Kenyans | | | | |
| Much better/Better | 36.5 | 31.0 | 40.1 | 36.3 |
| Worse/Same | 63.5 | 66.2 | 59.1 | 62.3 |
| N (likely to vote) | 1095 | 216 | 279 | 422 |